In 1932, the Australian government authorised a small military operation against an unlikely adversary: a large population of emus that had migrated into agricultural regions of Western Australia following a drought, causing extensive damage to wheat crops and farm fencing. Farmers, many of them military veterans, petitioned the government for assistance, ultimately leading to the deployment of soldiers armed with machine guns in what became known, somewhat derisively, as the 'Emu War'. The operation, however, proved far less effective than anticipated. Emus turned out to be surprisingly resilient and difficult targets, capable of absorbing multiple gunshot wounds and continuing to run at considerable speed, while their tendency to scatter in different directions when startled made coordinated machine-gun fire largely ineffective against the birds. After several days of limited success, with only a small fraction of the emu population affected despite considerable ammunition expenditure, military commanders withdrew the operation, and it was subsequently abandoned as a failure. The incident received widespread media coverage, including some international attention, and has since become a frequently cited example of a military campaign undermined by an underestimation of its adversary. Farmers ultimately turned to alternative methods, including bounty systems that incentivised civilian hunters, and improved fencing techniques, which proved considerably more effective than the initial military intervention had been.
It can be inferred from the passage that .
Neden?
Metin, çiftçilerin sonunda ödül sistemlerine ve geliştirilmiş çit tekniklerine yöneldiğini, bunların askerî müdahaleden 'considerably more effective' olduğunu söyler. Bu da sivil yöntemlerin daha etkili olduğu çıkarımını verir. Emuların hiç tehdit oluşturmadığı, harekâtın başarılı sayıldığı ve yurt dışında ilgi görmediği metinle çelişir.
AI ORIGINAL RC 15